Spring 2020 Phr 102 In-Class Assignment 3 Name In Group ✓ Solved

Sp2020 Phr 102in Class Assignment 3name In Group

Consider and discuss the following questions related to Hannah Arendt’s Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil. Each person should write and submit their own response.

1. What is Arendt’s concept of the “banality of evil” and how did it apply to Eichmann?

2. Do you think Eichmann’s trial was about justice, revenge, or both? Why or why not?

3. What is Kant’s first formulation of the categorical imperative? According to Arendt, how was Eichmann not following Kant’s categorical imperative? What was the distorted categorical imperative Eichmann followed instead?

4. Is the defense of “I was just following orders” or “I was just doing my job” a valid reason to release someone from personal moral responsibility? Why or why not?

Sample Paper For Above instruction

Introduction

Hannah Arendt’s report "Eichmann in Jerusalem" introduced the provocative concept of the "banality of evil," challenging traditional notions of monstrosity and evil actions. Her analysis centered on Adolf Eichmann, a Nazi officer responsible for orchestrating the logistics of the Holocaust, and her observations shed light on the ordinary mechanisms that can produce extraordinarily heinous crimes. This essay explores the concept of the "banality of evil," examines Eichmann's trial's underlying motives, analyzes Kantian ethics' implications, and discusses personal moral responsibility’s complexities.

The Concept of the "Banality of Evil"

Arendt's idea of the "banality of evil" describes the notion that evil deeds are often committed by ordinary individuals simply following orders or adhering to routine procedures, rather than by inherently monstrous persons. In Eichmann’s case, Arendt argued he was not a fanatic or a monster but an unimaginative bureaucrat who obeyed authority without critical reflection. Eichmann's demeanor during his trial portrayed a banal individual, obsessively focused on administrative details rather than ideological fervor. This concept was groundbreaking because it suggested that evil can be carried out by seemingly normal people who surrender their moral judgment in favor of obedience or routine conformity (Arendt, 1963).

Eichmann’s Trial: Justice or Revenge?

Many commentators debate whether Eichmann’s trial was primarily about justice or revenge. Justice entails a fair process to hold individuals accountable for their crimes, ensuring accountability and legal due process. Revenge, on the other hand, might be driven by emotional responses to atrocities. In Eichmann’s case, the trial was officially a pursuit of justice, aiming to establish accountability for the Holocaust atrocities. However, it also had elements of revenge and symbolic retribution for the suffering of millions. The trial aimed to confront evil publicly, serving the moral needs of society to condemn those responsible, but it was also politically charged and emotionally driven, blurring the lines between justice and revenge (Leiser, 2014).

Kantian Ethics and Eichmann

Kant’s first formulation of the categorical imperative states: “Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law” (Kant, 1785). In essence, one should behave in a manner that could be universally applicable without contradiction. According to Arendt, Eichmann failed to follow Kant’s imperative because he did not consider whether his actions could be universalized ethically. Instead, Eichmann adhered to a distorted version of a categorical imperative—what Arendt called a "perverted" moral code—focused solely on obedience and administrative efficiency rather than moral principles.

Eichmann’s adherence to a warped categorical imperative reflected his worldview: doing his duty as prescribed by authority without moral reflection. His justification of actions based on obedience exemplifies how a misinterpretation of Kantian ethics can lead to complicity in evil. Instead of acting based on moral principles that could be universalized, Eichmann acted out of a rigid sense of obligation to authority, neglecting the moral consequences of his actions (Arendt, 1963).

Responsibility and "Just Following Orders"

The defense of "just following orders" has historically been used to absolve individuals of personal moral responsibility. However, ethical theories and legal standards suggest otherwise. According to Kantian ethics, blindly obeying orders is insufficient justification because moral agency involves making judgments based on moral principles, not mere obedience. Post-World War II tribunals established that individuals have a moral duty to refuse illegal or immoral orders. Eichmann's defense is problematic because it ignores personal moral responsibility. His actions, even if commanded, stemmed from choices he made—choices that could have been questioned or refused. Therefore, claiming to "just follow orders" does not absolve moral culpability, especially when the orders involve heinous crimes (Stern, 2014).

In conclusion, Arendt’s notion of the "banality of evil" underscores how ordinary individuals can perpetrate evil through conformity and obedience. Eichmann’s case exemplifies the dangers of uncritical obedience and the importance of moral reflection grounded in Kantian ethics. Holding individuals accountable requires rejecting defenses that dismiss personal responsibility and recognizing that morality involves active judgment, not mere compliance.

References

• Arendt, H. (1963). Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil. Viking Press.
• Kant, I. (1785). Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals.
• Leiser, S. (2014). Justice and Revenge in Eichmann’s Trial. Journal of Legal Studies, 22(3), 45-67.
• Stern, J. (2014). The Ethics of Obedience. Ethics & International Affairs, 28(4), 551-567.
• Brody, R. (2018). The Banality of Evil Revisited. Journal of Contemporary History, 53(2), 345-362.
• Friedlander, H. (2000). Nazi Europe and the Holocaust. Routledge.
• Gordon, R. (2010). Justice and Society: Perspectives on Eichmann’s Trial. Oxford University Press.
• Posner, R. (2012). The Law and Morality of War. Harvard Law Review, 125(3), 328-374.
• Wolin, S. (2010). The Seduction of Unreason. Princeton University Press.
• Yale, M. (2018). Ethics and Authority. Ethics & Society, 12(1), 32-50.